![]() In addition to the MSP is the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act allows 60 congressionally-funded agreements under the MSP of various vessel sizes to support dry cargo transport. The MSP relies on independent companies to commit vessels, but no ships are tankers. ![]() government for an annual retainer so that, if needed, the vessels in the MSP will become available to support wartime sustainment. The MSP fleet works off contractual agreements between U.S.-registered vessels and the U.S. The MSP is a fleet of merchant ships that can provide sealift capacity during a time of war. The Maritime Security Act of 1996 established the MSP as the commercial solution for DoD’s wartime logistics requirement. Since the Navy does not sustain a robust logistics grey hull fleet due to funding, maintenance, and manpower shortfalls, the DoD relies on commercial shipping to fill the gap through the congressionally approved Maritime Security Program (MSP). land forces, especially mechanized units, require significant fuel and dry cargo tonnage. The Navy’s logistics fleet primarily supports Navy and Marine assets. Of those logistic vessels, 12 move dry cargo, and 25 move petroleum. While a Geographic Combatant Command has the authority to direct a single service to provide “common item” logistics to other services within the joint force, the Navy fleet cannot support the full spectrum of operations across all services. Today the Navy’s grey hull fleet is 296 strong, with only 37 logistic vessels. does not have nearly the same sealift capacity it did pre-WWII, nor the shipyards to generate ships as it did with the 1941 Shipbuilding Act. military would still rely on a combination of military and commercial vessels to sustain maritime and land forces. Navy’s fleet remained in the AOR on a constant basis, supplied by an entire military and commercial logistics fleet. German submarines effectively took out 141 tankers in the Atlantic, sinking a quarter of the U.S. oilers at Pearl Harbor or throughout the war like Germany did in the Atlantic. only had four oilers on the west coast capable of at-sea refueling. Fortunately, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) did not deliberately target U.S. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the U.S. had to move land and maritime forces thousands of miles from Hawaii to Australia to the landing sites. To understand why refocusing on sealift to prepare for potential great power conflict is so important, look no further than the Pacific theater in WWII. The past two decades of focus on the counterinsurgency fight have stymied U.S. Failing to address these critical sealift shortfalls could degrade deterrence and invite defeat in conflict. By focusing on these areas DoD will become more able to prosecute expeditionary conflict against China should the need arise. The DoD’s critical sealift vulnerabilities against China include fuel distribution capacity, operational security, and vulnerability to partnerships to establish seaports of debarkation and fleet logistics centers. military is prepared to win expeditionary warfare, they feature critical vulnerabilities with respect to competition with China. While the MSC and MARAD aim to ensure the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command’s (MSC) grey hull fleet. The United States’ Maritime Administration (MARAD) uses tools such as the Maritime Security Program (MSP), Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA), and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) to supplement the U.S. The DoD sustains expeditionary forces with both military and commercial contracted shipping assets. military to support expeditionary forces with extremely robust logistics. military’s logistical challenges.Ī conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific will require the U.S. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the largest navy in the world, outnumbering the United States by approximately 60 ships in 2020. The BRI and growing navy are part of President Xi Jinping’s strategy to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, and they both will contribute to the U.S. alliance disruptors as China expands its reach in the Indo-Pacific and across the globe. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one of the key U.S. China’s growing navy and increasingly hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific have the potential to disrupt alliances and create a unique logistical problem for expeditionary U.S. The shift in focus requires that DoD reassess its critical vulnerabilities, especially against its principal great power rival, China. Department of Defense has shifted its focus away from fighting insurgents in the Middle East to prepare for large-scale combat operations.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |